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The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute 
Tiny Islets and Immense Legal Problems
Introduction
A fleeting glimpse of a political map of the world may bring about 
an impression of our planet being precisely and finally parceled between 
nearly two hundred sovereign states. However, the  reality is less ideal 
with dozens of territorial disputes raging on. A conflict between China 
and Japan over a group of islands in the East China Sea is one of them. 
The islands are called Diaoyu or Diaoyutai by the Chinese and Senkaku 
in Japan. These names will be used simultaneously (or replaced by a ref-
erence to “the Islands”) to avoid the impression that the author supports 
or sympathizes with either one of the parties involved.
The  tension over the  Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has attracted world-
wide attention since, at least, 2010 and a famous boat collision incident. 
The conflict, as it stands now, is mostly analyzed through the lenses of 
political science. Nevertheless the perception of the problem will be shift-
ed here and it is going to be tackled from the perspective of public inter-
national law: legal and only legal arguments are going to be examined to 
find out which set of legal reasoning (out of two presented by both states) 
seems to be more persuasive.
At the outset some basic geographical features of the Islands are go-
ing to be presented as of the utmost importance for legal reasoning in 
this case. The  Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located approximately mid-
way between the island of Taiwan and the southernmost Ryukyu Islands 
of Japan. Those three points: Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and 
southern Ryukyu form an almost equilateral triangle with the length of 
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all sides between 88–90 nautical miles (NM). Therefore the  Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands are neither in the immediate vicinity of China nor Japan. 
The  Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands consist of eight tiny uninhabited Islands 
with a permanently dry surface. Five of them are relatively large volcanic 
structures partly covered with some vegetation; the three remaining islets 
are mere rocky outcroppings. The total size of the whole group is approx-
imately six square kilometers, comparable in size to the Warsaw Airport, 
which is not the largest one in Europe by the way.
The last observation provokes a question as to the reasons that have 
driven both states into the fierce conflict over such an inconspicuous piece 
of the land. The motives are abundant: ideological, economical or polit-
ical, though those fields will not be explored here. However, one cannot 
omit a possible legal reason for the relevant dispute. Both states are par-
ties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 
(UNCLOS) and hence article 121 UNCLOS is applicable to them.1 Article 
121 paragraph 2 states that an island may generate: the territorial sea of 
12 NM, the Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 NM and the continental 
shelf zone (at least 200 NM). Consequently it is estimated that the own-
ership of the  Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands might bring to a  sovereign-state 
an additional maritime space of between 19,800NM2 and 70,000 NM2. 
It seems understandable then, why China and Japan cross swords over 
the setiny, volcanic islets.
Certainly not every formation protruding over the sea level has this 
effect. Pursuant to article 121 paragraph 3 UNCLOS, a rock “which can-
not sustain human habitation or economic life of their own” may have 12 
NM territorial sea only. However, according to some sources, the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands hosted relatively extensive economic activity at the turn 
of XIX and XX century: allegedly more than a hundred persons worked 
there. Therefore, if this information is reliable, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Is-
lands appear to be a group of i s l a n d s  (and not rocks) within the mean-
ing of article 121 UNCLOS, and may generate not only territorial sea but 
also an Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Zone.
1 “1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above 
water at high tide. 2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the con-
tiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are 
determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other 
land territory. 3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of 
their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf”.
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Moreover, the East China Sea is semi-enclosed and, what is of par-
ticular importance, the coast-to-coast distance between China and Japan 
is less than 400 NM. Hence if both states establish Exclusive Economic 
Zones of 200 NM each and Continental Shelf Zones of 200 NM each, 
these zones will overlap. This, in turn, may require delimitation of re-
spective areas. And it cannot be excluded, a t  l e a s t  t h e o r e t i -
c a l l y , that the territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
might be advantageous in the delimitation process. On the other hand, 
that is in practice, one would be cautious not to over-estimate the Sen-
kaku/DiaoyuIslandsin the delimitation of maritime zones. According to 
article 74 and 83 UNCLOS, the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic 
Zones and Continental Shelf between opposite or adjacent states should 
be effected by agreement only, and must achieve an e q u i t a b l e  solu-
tion. As a rule, an equitable solution is reached by drawing a median line 
between the territories of the two opposite states. Every point of this line 
must be equidistant from the nearest points of the territories of compet-
ing states. Does this mean that the  Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are to be 
regarded as “territory” of either China or Japan for the purpose of drawing 
such a median line? Not necessarily. In practice, to reach such an equi-
table result in separating maritime spaces, small and isolated islets such 
as the  Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are totally or partly ignored in drawing 
a maritime boundary: they are not regarded as “territory” for the purpose 
of drawing a  median line. It would be a g a i n s t  e q u i t y  to grant 
a large part of maritime spaces to a state, only due to the fact this state is 
a sovereign over remote, isolated and small volcanic outcrops. Therefore 
it cannot be excluded that an impact the Islands may have in the delimi-
tation of maritime zones is insignificant.
A starting point for a legal analysis of the dispute between China and 
Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is the history of the Islands and 
so called “critical dates”. It is mandatory as time passes by and influences 
everything, year by year and century by century. Not only do people get 
older but also states rise or collapse and international law is in a constant 
transition. Even legal rights of states are affected by the passage of time: 
they form, they crystallize and they disappear in time, mainly as a result 
of activities conducted by states. Therefore, when one deals with the ter-
ritorial dispute and tries to find out which party has a better legal right 
to the  Islands, it is necessary to establish when those competing legal 
rights allegedly crystallized or disappeared in the past to the effect that 
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subsequent acts made by states could not alter the legal position no more. 
There are two critical dates in the history of the Islands: (a) 14 January 
1895 – when the of Japan decided to formally incorporate the Islands as 
an alleged terra nullius (territory belonging to no state); and (b) 1972 – 
when the Okinawa Reversion Agreement entered into force between Ja-
pan and the United States of America. The latter reverted administration 
over the  Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to Japan. Paradoxically, the  turbulent 
period that started thereafter has not significantly influenced Chinese and 
Japanese legal rights as to the Islands and, consequently, it will be skipped 
as legally irrelevant.
Incorporation of terrae nullius
The first date is crucial due to some substantial discrepancies between 
China and Japan over the legal effect of the decision made by the Govern-
ment of Japan to incorporate the  Islands as terra nullius. Japan asserts 
that the decision amounted to a permissible and valid incorporation of 
terra nullius. To the contrary, China strongly criticizes Japanese position 
and maintains that in January 1895 the Islands belonged to China and 
could not be incorporated as terra nullius. Here, we have words against 
words and arguments against arguments. However, in this respectthe 
onus of proof, is on China. Therefore, if China claims that in January 
1895 the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were not terra nullius as the  Islands 
belonged to it then China is to produce appropriate evidence.
The Chinese position on the issue was roughly presented in a state-
ment by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 
dated September 10, 2012. The document stresses that Japan in 1895 
“illegally occupied the Diaoyu Island” as China allegedly had the original 
right to the Islands due to a so called “historic title”: the Islands had been 
known to the Chinese and had been used by them from time immemo-
rial. Public international law clearly accepts that a given territory may be 
acquired in that way if certain conditions are fulfilled. A state claiming 
the historic title (China in this case): (a) must have been exercising au-
thority over area in a continuous way; (b) this exercise of authority was 
met with acquiescence (recognition, acceptance) by other states. The later 
condition certainly would be satisfied as no other state raised its claims 
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands before January 1895. However, the for-
mer one is more challenging to demonstrate. At least four arguments 
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are put forward by China, trying to prove their exercise of authority over 
the Islands before that critical date.
The first one accentuates that the Islands and surrounding waters were 
used throughout centuries by Chinese fishermen who collected herbs on 
them and had their fishing grounds around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 
It appears, however, that sole activities by private persons c a n n o t  b e 
p e r c e i v e d  a s  e f f e c t i v e  o c c u p a t i o n  b y   a   s t a t e , 
unless those activities took place under governmental authority, which 
apparently was not the case here. Therefore, the mere presence of Chinese 
fishermen in and around the Islands through many centuries has only one 
meaning: it shows that states other than China did not exercise territorial 
competences over disputed territory.
The  second Chinese contention employs the  fact that century for 
five hundred years since the  14th diplomatic missions were being sent 
by Chinese Emperors to the Ryukyu Islands, which had been brought into 
the Chinese tributary system by the Ming Dynasty. Chinese envoys and 
navigators used to present reports on their voyages to Chinese Emper-
ors. Those reports contain clear indication that envoys treated the Sen-
kaku/Diaoyu Islands as a  kind of navigational beacon. There are also 
accounts that Chinese navigators clearly perceived the Islands as laying 
on waters belonging to China. There was a geographical reasoning that 
a shallow part of the East China Sea is separated from the Ryukyu Islands 
by the Okinawa Trough, a deep seabed feature. When Chinese ships trav-
elled East: from the continent to the Ryukyu Islands, there was a place 
where the color of the seawater changed dramatically. The light blue of 
the shallow shelf-sea was suddenly replaced by navy blue of the deep open 
sea. The Chinese perceived this line as a boundary between “home” and 
“alien” waters and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were on the “home side”. 
Nevertheless, maps still cannot be treated as decisive evidence. The In-
ternational Court of Justice noted in this respect in Frontier Dispute (Bur-
kina Faso v. Mali), which states that whether in frontier delimitation or 
in international territorial conflicts, maps merely constitute information 
which varies in accuracy from case to case; of themselves, and by virtue 
solely of their existence, they cannot constitute a territorial title, that is, 
a document endowed by  international law with intrinsic legal force for 
the purpose of establishing territorial rights.
The third and the fourth Chinese arguments refer to its jurisdiction 
exercised over the disputed territory before 1895. It is claimed in particular 
that the Islands were incorporated into the Chinese costal defense system 
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and formed a part of a naval patrolling area, an example of executive ju-
risdiction. Moreover, the  Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are a  rare source of 
supply of a medicinal herb (statice arbuscula), used as a remedy against 
high blood pressure. As late as 1893, the Chinese Empress Dowager Ci Xi 
awarded three of the disputed Islands to a Chinese family for the purpose 
of collecting the herb, an example of legislative jurisdiction.
In fact, evidence of Chinese control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
are scarce and dispersed in time. However, it is generally admitted in in-
ternational law that even slight activity will suffice to establish a  state 
control over inhabited, remote and tiny islands.2 Thus Iam inclined to 
conclude that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands did not constitute terrae nul-
lius in January 1895 as they belonged to China. Therefore they could 
not be legally acquired by Japan by its unilateral act of incorporation of 
terrae nullius. However, this finding is not the one that ends the dispute 
definitely. There are still other ways to argue that Japan holds the legal 
right to the  Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. It may be claimed, in particular, 
that the Islands became a part of Japanese territory as a result of acquisi-
tive prescription. It means that Japan could acquire the territory that had 
previously belonged to China as a result of the passage of time if during 
this time: (a) Japan, not China, possessed the  territory as a  sovereign; 
and (b) this possession was peaceful and uninterrupted. This peaceful and 
uninterrupted possession requires inter alia the expression or tacit con-
sent by China on Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 
These issues are to be discussed bellow.
Acquisitive prescription
As to the  possession: in 1884 Tatsushiro Koga, a  Japanese private 
entrepreneur from Fukuoka Prefecture, hit upon the  idea to use the  Is-
lands for his business activities. A few years later, in 1894, he applied for 
2 “Manifestations of territorial sovereignty assume, it is true, different forms, according 
to conditions of time and place. Although continuous in principle, sovereignty cannot 
be exercised in fact at every moment on every point of a territory. The intermittence 
and discontinuity compatible with the maintenance of the right necessarily differ ac-
cording as inhabited or uninhabited regions are involved, or regions enclosed within 
territories in which sovereignty is incontestably displayed or again regions accessible 
from, for instance, the high seas”, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Island of Palmas 
Case (Netherlands v. USA), Award of 4 April 1928.
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a required leasehold contract to the Okinawa Prefecture government and 
then to the Home Ministry and the Ministry of Agriculture and Com-
merce in Tokyo. Both applications were turned down as apparently it was 
not clear at that time whether the Islands belonged to Japan. There is an 
official correspondence preserved from the 21st of October 1885 between 
the  Japanese Foreign Minister and the Minister of Interior. The  former 
wrote: “the islands involved were very small, having Chinese names, and 
very close to the Chinese coast”, and that “recently some Chinese news-
papers had reported rumors about a Japanese occupation of certain islands 
near Taiwan and urged the Qing government to be alert”. He advised to 
postpone the plan to start the development of the  Islands and to place 
national markers there. This letter constitutes, by the way, another indi-
rect evidence against a view that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were terra 
nullius at the time.
Nonetheless, the  “Japanese discovery” of the  Islands by Tatsushiro 
Kogahad profound consequences as they were brought into Japanese at-
tention. Consequently, on the 14th of January 1895, during the Sino-Jap-
anese War, the Japanese government finally decided to incorporate them. 
What is of paramount importance here, the decision w a s  n o t  a n -
n o u n c e d: China and the  international society were not aware that 
the Islands had been incorporated. Yet the date marked the beginning of 
Japanese presence on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The evidence of Japa-
nese control over the Islands is plentiful relating to a display of both ex-
ecutive and legislative jurisdiction. The Koga family, having finally leased 
the  Islands in 1896 free of charge for thirty years, launched economic 
activities there. Japanese workers collected guano and albatross feathers 
and allegedly a small factory of bonito (dried and smoked tuna) was estab-
lished. Scores of seasonal workers were brought to the Islands every year. 
After the expiration of the leasing contract, Mr. Koga bought the Islands 
from the Japanese government and became their owner according to Jap-
anese law.3 Japan exercised control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands at 
the time as evidenced by the setting up of a weather station in 1943 and 
traces of police control. This was all done without even slightest protest 
by China through out seven decades. Does this mean that China tacitly 
3 Longstanding repercussions of this private-law transfer were dramatically revealed as 
late as 2012 when tensions flared following the April announcement of Tokyo Gov-
ernor Shintaro Ishihara’s April that he intended to purchase three islets from their 
private owner.
211The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute. Tiny Islets…
recognized the Japanese possession of the territory? Does it mean that, 
as a  result of acquiescence (equivalent to tacit recognition manifested 
by unilateral conduct which the other party may interpret as consent), 
the legal right to the Islands passed from China to Japan on the basis of 
acquisitive prescription? The answer is apparently affirmative: the Chi-
nese protest against the Japanese possession of the Islands was rationally 
required to stop prescription. The absence of protest allegedly allowed pre-
scription. However, there is another dramatic turn in our story: the Treaty 
of Shimonseki. The  international agreement concluded between China 
and Japan to end warfare, contained article 2 (b). The provision stipulated 
that “China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following 
territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property 
thereon: […] The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining 
or belonging to the said island of Formosa”. It should be emphasized in 
this respect that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands lie some 90 NM northeast 
of the island of Formosa, thus not in the immediate vicinity. Hence forth 
it was not obvious whether the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were a subject 
of article 2 (b), all the more the Treaty did not expressly mention them. 
A bizarre feature of this provision is that both parties differed as to its ef-
fect in respect of the disputed territory. China claimed that the Treaty had 
resulted in cession of the Islands while Japan maintained that they could 
have not been ceded as they already had been a part of Japanese territory 
since January 1895. Nemodat qui non habet: no one gives what he has 
not got! Who is right, then? An international treaty to be effective must 
express m u t u a l  c o n s e n t  in a given respect. No consent no agree-
ment. Therefore, if both parties disagreed while entering into the treaty as 
to the effect of article 2 (b) in respect to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, this 
provision did not result in the cession of those Islands. This conclusion, 
although in conformity with Japanese assertions, has had a highly disad-
vantageous impact upon its position in this case.
As previously explained, the  legal basis for the  Japanese claims to 
the  Islands could be neither cession by  treaty nor acquisition of terrae 
nullius. The only viable legal basis for a Japanese title remains acquisitive 
prescription. Japan has possessed the Islands since 1895 in the absence of 
Chinese protests. However, China did not oppose as it regarded the Japa-
nese presence on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as a direct result of the Shi-
monoseki Treaty of April 1895. At the same time China could not link 
Japanese activities thereon with the January 1895 decision by the Japa-
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nese government since this decision had not been publicly proclaimed. 
All of this means that the silence of China and the lack of protest against 
the Japanese possession of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands did not amount 
to the acquiescence of prescription. It would be against the principles of 
international equity and good faith, it would also be irrational to demand 
Chinese protest against Japanese prescription when China could not be 
rationally required to know that Japan had just started prescription in 
January 1895.
Treaties after World War II
Finally, the  last issue must be tackled: when did it become clear to 
China that Japanese claims in respect to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island sare 
not based on the Treaty of Shimonseki, rather either on prescription or on 
occupation of terrae nullius? And when was the Chinese protest against 
Japanese activities on the Islands rationally required? Japan’s territory was 
occupied after World War II, from1945 until1952. The end of the occupa-
tion was marked by the Treaty of San Francisco. Pursuant to its article 3: 
Nansei Shoto (including the Ryukyu and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) were to 
be placed under the administration of the United States and during this 
period one of the Islands was used as a target for U.S. pilots practicing 
bombing runs.
As late as 1971 the U.S. and Japan concluded The Okinawa Reversion 
Agreement. The treaty resulted in a mere transfer of effective c o n t r o l 
over the  Islands, and not in the  transfer of l e g a l  t i t l e  to them; 
hence forth the document has no significance for the Sino-Japanese dis-
pute over the legal rights to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
The 1952 Treaty of Taipei was significantly more important. It con-
tained article IV, which provided that “all treaties, conventions and agree-
ments concluded before December 9, 1941, between Japan and China 
have become null and void as a consequence of the war”. This stipula-
tion clearly referred to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which became there-
by abrogated. Even if the People’s Republic of China has casted doubts 
upon the legal consequences of the Treaty of Taipei, as it was concluded 
by a “separatist government”, from their point of view this treaty is still 
important for the dispute discussed here. The Treaty of Taipei must have 
put both Chinese governments on notice that the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
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would no longer be a legal basis for the Japanese possession of the Senka-
ku/Diaoyu Islands. Accordingly, China had to protest to prevent acquisi-
tive prescription of the Islands by Japan.
The protests were raised, however, they occurred quite late as they ap-
peared in the 1970sand after rumors had spread out in regards to the gas 
and oil deposits under the  seabed all around the  Islands. Two decades 
is a  significant delay, even from the perspective of public international 
law. Therefore, it may appear that the  Islands became the  territory of 
Japan as a  result of acquisitive prescription between 1952 and 1970s. 
However, there is the  “if”… Japan would have acquired the  islands as 
a result of acquisitive prescription if it had p o s s e s s e d  the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands in this period. This was not the case, as between 1952 and 
the 1970s the Islands were placed under the administration of the United 
States. The lack of possession prevented acquisitive prescription by Japan.
All the havoc around the Islands that happened after 1972, the last 
critical date in this dispute, did not alter the legal situation in the case. 
The only relevant element appearing after this date was the clear and un-
equivocal protest by China against the Japanese presence on the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands. This protest means that after 1972, Japan did not acquire 
the territory by either the occupation of terrae nullius nor by acquisitive 
prescription and nor by international agreement.
Conclusions
The present case forms only a selected part of an extensive legal and 
political mosaic depicting an intense and complex territorial controver-
sy over islands and maritime areas in the East and South China Seas. 
China and Japan are not the only states involved in these disputes. Ma-
laysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam are also involved in articulat-
ing conflicting claims over, among others, the Paracel Islands, the Pratas 
Islands or the  Spratly Islands, thus making the  South and East China 
Seas the  Gordian Knot of perplexities inherently canvassing territorial 
disputes. Indubitably these disputes provide a  valuable opportunity for 
Beijing to demonstrate Urbi et Orbi, its self-perception of its own hegem-
onic position in the Asian region. Although the Chinese legal status in 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute seems to be more sound, as proved in 
the paper, Beijing consequently indicates its désintéressement in judicial 
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forms of dispute resolution. To the contrary it prefers unilateral acts that, 
while only multiplying (from the  legal point of view) Chinese previous 
assertions and intensifying a stalemate situation, consolidates Beijing’s po-
sition as a regional strong hand in a political perspective. A recent exam-
ple of China displaying its robust political attitude in relation to relevant 
territorial disputes is the  establishment of its air defense identification 
zone (ADIZ) over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the Autumn of 2013. As 
a consequence, noncommercial aircraft entering a broad zone over the East 
China Sea must first identify themselves to Beijing, at the risk of facing 
“defensive emergency measures” by the People’s Liberation Army. Japan re-
acted with a predictable incantation by the Foreign Ministry, which stated 
that “the airspace the Chinese side established […] is totally unacceptable 
and extremely regrettable as it includes the  Japanese territorial airspace 
over the Senkaku Islands, an inherent territory of Japan”.
Putting this ritual sabre-rattling aside, one still must not underesti-
mate the  international legal perception of legality or illegality as it still 
constitutes a general framework harnessing the political stance employed 
by  sovereign states in international territorial disputes and are clearly 
present in their political statements.
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